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ARGUMENT 
By way of introduction and to promote clarity, the Appellant is continually 
referred to below as "Wesley." Wesley's current spouse which he married subsequent to 
the parties' divorce is referred to as "Jana." The Appellee will be referred to as "Joye." 
I. UTAH LAW IS CLEAR THAT CHILD SUPPORT CANNOT BE 
INCLUDED IN A PARTY'S INCOME WHEN DETERMINING AN 
ALIMONY AWARD. 
Utah law clearly provides a payor spouse with deductions in gross income for tax 
liabilities and reasonable expenses. Montoya v. Montova. 2002 WL 1870282. % 1-2 
(Utah App. 2002) (a copy of which was attached to the Brief of the Appellant as 
Addendum "C" in accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 30(f)). Trial 
courts who fail to allow such reductions improperly overstate the payor spouse's income 
which, may result in a mistake creating grounds for reversal on appeal. Id. 
Utah law is equally clear that one deduction available is based upon any child 
support received. See Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah App. 1999) (where the 
court provided for "deductions for state and federal taxes, social security, health care 
premiums, child support and alimony"); Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103, 1106 
(Utah App. 1999) ("the child support paid [to the payor spouse] is earmarked for the 
parties' minor child and should not be considered as income to [the payor spouse] for 
purposes of calculating alimony"); and Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982) 
(stating "the basic and unalienable right to child support ... is vested in the minor"). 
Despite this clear line of authority, Joye provides summary statements throughout 
the Brief of Appellee that Jana's child support received should be included as income 
1 
when detemiining alimony. Specifically, Brief of Appellee continually states Wesley's 
available monthly income at $4,541.00. Brief of Appellee, 7, 8-9, 10. This figure is 
composed of the $3,941,00 of combined net income and an additional $600.00] to 
account for the child support received by Jana. Id. 
Joye's only citation to any authority on this issue is to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
5(&)(g)(hi)(A),~ which simply provides that a trial court "may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.5' The application of this statute is 
restricted to considering Jana's income and expenses in conjunction with Wesley's. It 
provides no specific insight helpful to support Joye's statement that Jana's child support 
should be included as income for either Jana or Wesley. There is, however, very clear 
authority which explicitly states that child support camiot be considered income of either 
Jana or Wesley. 
II. ISSUES BASED ON EVIDENCE NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL CANNOT 
BE ADDRESSED OR RELIED UPON ON APPEAL. 
With a few exceptions,3 iC[i]t is a well-established rule that a defendant who fails 
to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time 
on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996) (Citing State v. Lopez, 886 
1
 Testimony at trial evidenced that Jana received between $600.00 and $800.00 per 
month in child support. (R. 246 at 81:10-16; 246 at 71:2-11). However, based on 
relevant Utah case law cited above, the amount is completely irrelevant as no amount of 
child support can be included in a payor spouse's income. 
2
 The Brief of Appellee incorrectly provides an out-dated citation to Utah Code Ami. § 
30-3-5(7)(g)(iii)(A)(2001)," the correct citation is Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A). 
3
 The three exceptions stated in Irwin are (1) if the trial court committed plain error, (2) if 
"exceptional circumstances" exist or (3) if a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
made. 
2 
P.2dll05, 1113 (Utah 1994): State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App.1991)). Under State v. Law. 75 P.3d 923, 924 (Utah App. 2003), the parties to an 
appeal are restricted to the evidence contained in the trial record. Any attempt by the 
parties to offer new evidence not admitted at trial should not be considered during the 
appeal. Low v. Bonaccn 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant matter. Page 8 of the Appellee's Brief states, "Furthermore, the 
evidence at trial indicated Wesley had $100,000.00 in savings. Wesley is able to earn a[t] 
least 4% to 5% interest per annum on his savings." Joye continues by stating 
"[considering Wesley earns 4% to 5% per annum interest on his savings of $100,000.00 
he earns an additional $400.00 to $500.00 per month." Id. at 11. Such statements are 
both false and are also not contained on the trial court's record. The only testimony at 
trial concerning this matter was stated in an extremely brief exchange by Wesley during 
questions from Jove's trial counsel as follows: 
Q On this inheritance from your deceased parents of $ 100,000. what 
was the actual amount you received? 
A $95,000. 
Q So you've increased it by $5,000? 
A Yes, it's in stocks. 
Q Pardon me? 
A It's stocks. 
Q Right, and you just didn't cash those in or take any money at the 
time? 
A No. 
(R. 246 at 59:21-60:5). No other testimony at trial by any witness addressed this topic. 
Joye's statements in her Brief of Appellee are problematic for at least two reasons: First, 
Joye has incorrectly characterized these stocks, stating that they are part of Wesley's 
3 
savings and continue to generate a monthly or annual income. These stocks are not 
immediately available as an income generating vehicle which provides liquid funds as 
Joye suggests. In fact, Wesley's testimony is evidence that these stocks are an 
appreciable asset as opposed to an income generating vehicle. When asked whether he 
has cashed his stocks or taken any money out, Wesley answered in the negative. (R. 246 
at 60:2-5). They are an asset which has appreciated in value over time (as opposed to 
generating a monthly income for Wesley). 
Second, the trial court record was complete!)7 devoid of sufficient information to 
support Joye's statement that "Wesley is able to earn a[t] lease 4% to 5% interest per 
annum on his savings.'5 As stated previously, the above-referenced short exchange is the 
only testimony available and preserved on the record on this issue. Nothing at trial 
mentioned aiwthing at all about any interest rates, neither did the witnesses testify about 
how long it took for the stocks to appreciate from $95,000.00 to SI00.000.00. As Joye's 
statements concerning Wesley's inherited stock are false and/or are not contained on the 
trial court's record, this court should not be required to participate in guess-work which 
would lead to fabrication of evidence which was never presented to the trial court. 
III. THIS COURT IS PERMITTED TO TERMINATE THE ALIMONY 
AWARD SINCE WESLEY'S REASONABLE EXPENSES EXCEED HIS 
AVAILABLE INCOME. 
At a bare minimum, this Court should remand this matter for further proceedings 
because the trial court has only provided cursory statements and have failed to include 
sufficient detail and subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion was reached. See Van Dyke v. Van Dyke., 86 P.3d 767,110 (Utah App. 2004) 
4 
(citations omitted); and McKenzie v. McKenzie, 2001 WL 333089, % 1 (Utah App. 2001) 
(a copy of which was attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Addendum "B" in 
accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 30(f) ("the trial court cannot 
simply state the obligor's earnings. To be sufficient the findings should also address [the 
obligor's] needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and other living 
expenses") (citing Rehn v, Rehm 1999 UT App 41, % 10, 974 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah App. 
1999)). 
However, if "pertinent facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," this Court may vacate and terminate 
the alimony award as a matter of law. Davis v. Davis, 2001 WL 1340747, % 1 (Utah App. 
2001) (a copy of which was attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Addendum "A" in 
accordance with Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 30(f); (see also Marshall v. 
Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1996); and McKenzie. 2001 WL 333089 at % 1 
(stating that the appellate court "must reverse unless the record is clear and 
uncontroverted as to allow us to apply the factors as a matter of law7")). 
Uncontroverted evidence presented at trial shows that Wesley and Jana's 
combined net income is $3,941.00. (R. 246 at 57:16-20). Joye's Brief of Appellee 
readily adopts the fact that Wesley and Jana's combined net income is $3,941.00, but 
then attempts to improperly inflate this figure by inappropriately including $600.00 of 
Jana's child support (which would raise Wesley's combined net income to $4,541.00). 
Brief of Appellee, 7, 8-9, 10. As provided above, child support cannot be included in a 
payor spouse's income when determining an alimony award and Wesley's combined net 
5 
income should remain at S3,941.00. 
Further, uncontroverted evidence presented at trial shows that Wesley's combined 
reasonable expenses were not less than S4.058.62.4 Again, this figure covers only the 
absolute bare minimum of their reasonable expenses which Wesley and Jana pa}' each 
month to provide for a family of five individuals. There are several other categories of 
expenses in Wesley and Jana's budget that could quite easily be categorized as 
"reasonable." By using this figure ($4,058.62). Wesley is not acknowledging that only 
$4,000.00 in his budget is reasonable. Rather, its purpose is to show that even the bare 
and necessary expenses, without including all "reasonable expenses." exceeds Wesley 
and Jana's combined income. This figure (which is $1,068.33 lower than the budget 
presented at trial and supported by testimony) is used by way of example alone as surely 
their "reasonable expenses" are greater than $4,058.62. 
For the first time on appeal. Jove argues that Wesley's expenses should be reduced 
by an additional $210.00 to account for Jana's tithing ($180.00) and fast offerings paid as 
charitable contributions ($30.00) because these expenses are not reasonable. Brief of 
Appellee, 8. Although it appears that this specific issue (whether tithing and fast 
offerings and other charitable contributions are a reasonable expense when determining 
an alimony award) is an issue of first impression, such expenses can quite easily be 
considered reasonable expenses. 
However, even assuming arguendo that these expenses are not reasonable, this 
4
 Wesley and Jana's reasonable expenses are more fully discussed in Brief of the 
Appellant, 7-11. 
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adjustment would only reduce Wesley's expenses to a minimum of S3.S48.62 ($4,058.62 
- $210.00 - $3,848.62). Based on Wesley's combined net income of $3,941.00, Joye's 
best case scenario (of excluding charitable contributions) would only provide Wesley 
with S92.3S ($3,941.00 - $3,848.62 = $92.38) to pay an alimony award of $400.00, not 
talcing into account the additional monthly expenses that could also be considered as 
reasonable for a family of five. The trial court allowed Jove several reasonable expenses 
(entertainment and incidentals), yet failed to specify whether Wesley was granted 
deductions for the same categories. A non-exclusive list of reasonable expenses incurred 
by Wesley which are not included in the $4,058.62 are: home maintenance and repairs, 
automobile or medical accidents, life insurance, homeowner's insurance, temporary loss 
of income, vacations, entertainment expenses, basic cable/satellite television plan, 
cellular telephones, health club subscription, a newspaper subscription, and other 
miscellaneous expenses. 
Joye's proposed budget (which was found to be "reasonable" in the trial court's 
FFCL; R. 313-314) included $630.00 of estimated expenses that Jove testified she was 
not, in fact, paying for at the time of trial. See Budget of Joye Felt, a copy of which is 
attached to the Brief of the Appellant as Addendum "R". Joye's expenses also included 
$50.00 per month for "Entertainment" (for only one person), $275.00 for "Car (estimated 
payment, insurance)" since Joye did not have a car payment at the time, and $50.00 for 
"Incidentals." Id. If these types of expenses (entertainment and incidentals), including 
hypothetical expenses, are considered reasonable for Jove, it would be inequitable to 
view these exact same expenses in a different light when Wesley attempts to claim them 
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as reasonable expenses. Evidence presented at trial stated that Wesley spent $182.00 for 
"All Other Expenses" or incidentals^ and $120.00 per month on Entertainment.0 Jove's 
trial counsel even allowed Wesley's entertainment as a reasonable expense in her closing 
argument to the trial court. (R. 246 at 80:24). 
In sum, at a bare minimum, Wesley must be granted the same categories of 
reasonable expenses that Joy was. If Wesley's combined expenses were reduced by 
$210.00 to cover charitable contributions (as Jove argues), Wesley must be allowed to 
include the same reasonable expenses which Jove was permitted to use (entertainment 
and incidentals). This would mean that Wesley's combined income of $3,941.00 would 
still by swallowed by his combined expenses of $4,150.62 (calculated by the original 
expenses of $4,058.62, minus charitable contributions of $210.00, plus Wesley's 
entertainment of $120.00 and incidentals of $182.00), leaving him a deficit of $209.62 
each month and 2,515.44 per year. Again, these are only two possible categories 
(entertainment and incidentals) out of many which may be considered reasonable 
expenses. This situation alone permits this Court to vacate and terminate the alimony 
award in favor of Wesley as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
In conclusion, Wesley respectfully requests that this Court determine that the 
Order dated October 24, 2006 and FFCL of November 305 2005 be vacated and the 
5
 R. 246 at 56:10-14; 57:3-7; 69:21-70:3, see also Wesley's Financial Declaration which 
is attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum "E". 
6
 R. 246 at 53:23-25, a copy of Wesley's Financial Declaration is attached to the Brief of 
the Appellant as Addendum "E". 
8 
alimony award be terminated in favor of Wesley as a matter of law pursuant to Marshall, 
915P.2dat516(UtahApp. 1996) and McKenzie, 2001 WL 333089 at«[i 1. However, 
this Court should vacate the trial court's order and remand this matter to the trial court 
(for a second time) with another set of additional instructions. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of August, 2007. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN, AND MCKAY, L.L.C. 
Jerejmy M. Shorts 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant. 
Wesley G. Van Dyke 
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of August, 2007, two (2) tme and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of the 
Appellant were served by the following method on the person(s) indicated below: 
Robert L. Neeley 
NEELEY & NEELEY 
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200 
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_X US Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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Hand-Delivery 
Ascione, Heideman & McKay, L.L.C. 
Assistant to Jeremy M. Shorts 
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